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Politics and Strategy Practice: An Ethnomethodologically-
informed Discourse Analysis Perspective 
 
 
Abstract 
In this article we aim to contribute to the ‘strategy as practice’ (SAP) field by 
studying organizational politics from an ethnomethodological perspective. We argue 
that it is important to study not only the ‘politics of sensemaking’, but also the 
‘sensemaking of politics’. Existing research has examined how power and politics 
plays a role in the sensemaking processes involved in strategic action, yet we have 
little understanding to date about how power and politics are made sense of in 
accounts and used by members to conduct their practical affairs. Drawing on an in-
depth qualitative study of a multi-national branded apparel company, we show how 
politics constitutes a key interpretive method through which organizational reality is 
constructed and strategic decisions are made. We address two key research questions: 
How can we study politics as an interpretive procedure rather than a pre-existing 
entity? What practical actions are achieved through such interpretive procedures? The 
study reveals how a cross-functional team of senior managers used discourse to 
collectively co-author a version of the political landscape of the firm during team 
meeting interactions, with practical implications for how the group sought to 
undertake strategic change. As such, the paper furthers our understanding of the social 
construction of politics and strategy and puts forward a new and potentially more 
insightful form of analysis we call Ethnomethodologically-informed Discourse 
Analysis (EDA). 
 
Keywords 
Discourse, Ethnomethodology, Politics, Power, Sensemaking, Strategy, Strategy as 
Practice.  
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Introduction 
The so-called ‘practice turn’ in strategic management has been helpful in moving 
beyond the question of what strategy an organization has towards viewing strategy as 
something people do.
1
 However, research in the ‘strategy as practice’ (SAP) field has 
yet to satisfactorily address the issue of power and politics.
2
 In this article we aim to 
advance the field by bringing the process of making sense of politics to the fore-front 
of analysis. We adopt Maitlis’ view that accounts are a central resource for 
sensemaking and draw on insights from ethnomethodology and discourse analysis to 
develop a method of analysis which we call Ethnomethodologically-informed 
Discourse Analysis (EDA).
3
 EDA, we propose, enables us to study the corpus of 
interpretive methods through which a meaningful sense of the self and/or world is 
constructed through accounts.
4
 We argue that politics, as a “social fact”, is not a stable 
external entity but rather is produced by an ongoing process of interpretation.
5 
We 
advance existing work on sensemaking, strategy and politics by showing how 
sensemaking about politics enables strategists to render the organizational landscape 
intelligible and action-able. 
Drawing on an in-depth qualitative action research study of a strategic change 
initiative in a multinational branded apparel company, we highlight the role of 
discourse - practices of language-use in the form of accounts - in making sense of 
power and politics in the strategy meetings of a cross-functional project team.
6
 We 
follow the tradition of ethnomethodological research  in conducting a fine-grained 
analysis of one specific episode, based on transcribed tape recordings, to show how 
senior managers (in conjunction with an action researcher) in a cross-functional 
project team used power and politics as interpretive resources for making sense of key 
strategic issues such as ‘what is going on?’ and ‘what should we do next’? 7 
Within existing literature, strategy has been studied as a process of 
sensemaking and as a process imbued with power and politics.
8
 However, there 
remains a taken-for-granted assumption about how the former relates to the latter. 
Existing work has been restricted to studying the role of power and politics in shaping 
sensemaking processes– a kind of ‘one way street’ of influence.9 This work views 
power and politics as something that actors have (as a possession or property) and that 
affects their strategic behavior; including their sensemaking. We challenge this taken-
for-granted assumption and propose a different perspective that views politics as an 
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interpretive procedure that enables actors to author accounts that make sense of the 
organizational landscape (What political motives and allegiances could be at play?) 
and envision a strategic direction for the future (Where should we go next?). Thus, 
our aim is to do more than ‘fill a gap’ in existing research on power and politics by 
simply adding another dimension to the influence that politics is understood to wield 
over strategic behaviour.
10 
Rather, our aim is to challenge the dominant assumption 
that organizational politics is simply an input into – and force acting over – processes 
of strategic sensemaking.  
We propose that sensemaking accounts are important vehicles in and of 
themselves for bringing politics ‘alive’ in the “performative language games involved 
in strategic decision-making”.11 Politics, we propose, is not simply an objective force 
that acts over strategists, but rather is rendered into a ‘social fact’ through ongoing 
processes of discursive sensemaking. Moreover, we propose that these accounts make 
a difference to strategic decision-making by providing answers to the questions 
‘where should we go?’ and ‘how should we get there?’ In other words, sensemaking 
about politics is, we propose, central to the very work of strategists as they go about 
conceiving and implementing strategic plans. We conclude by proposing that the 
interpretive procedures for making sense of power and politics should be placed at 
the centre of the strategy-as-practice research agenda and put forward a new approach 
to discourse analysis – Ethnomethodologically-informed Discourse Analysis (EDA) – 
as a theory and method for advancing this research agenda.  
 
Strategy as Practice 
The rapidly growing and influential field of ‘strategy as practice’ (SAP) research 
focuses on the “micro-level social activities, processes and practices that characterize 
organizational strategy and strategizing”.12 The value of the SAP perspective lies in 
moving away from the analytical concern with what strategy should be (e.g. based on 
analysis of external market opportunities or internal core competencies), or how it 
should be done (e.g. top-down formal planning or incremental emergent actions), 
towards how it is actually done in practice. Existing SAP research has focused on the 
role of managerial sensemaking and leadership, discourse, metaphors, rhetoric, 
emotion, norms and values, habitus; processes of recursiveness and adaptation and the 
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mundane practices of crafting together strategy workshops, away-days, artifacts and 
presentations. 
13
 
In their review of the ‘state of the art’ in strategy-as-practice, Golsorkhi et al 
highlight a number of key themes in the SAP literature, placing sensemaking, 
discourse and power and politics centre-stage, along with themes of materiality, 
identity, tools and techniques.
14
 This paper develops a new perspective that brings 
sensemaking, discourse and politics together in a different way, by showing how 
discourse - in the form of accounts - is central to the processes of making sense of 
politics.
15
  
Power and politics has been central to the strategy literature long before the 
so-called ‘turn to practice’. The classic work of Pettigrew pointed to the myriad of 
power contests and political behaviour at the heart of strategy-making, ranging from 
group power-contests, such as battles over resources or influence between functions 
or departments, sub-group politics, where a set of actors share a certain interest in 
securing resources, information or status, and individual politics where a person’s 
career, reputation and rewards are at stake.
16
 Indeed, the strategic management 
literature has a long history of highlighting the role of power and politics in strategy 
formulation or strategic decision-making and the diffusion of strategy across an 
organization.
17
 More recent work has also begun to view power and politics as a 
necessary and sometimes productive part of organizational behaviour and an 
important strategic competence for practitioners.
18
 
This existing work is founded on a view of power and politics as a property 
that actors have, as an attribute or possession. For example, power is viewed as a 
property of an actor that accrues from the ability to control resources or manipulate 
information, and politics is viewed as an attribute of an actor that arises from the 
desire to protect or further existing ‘turf’ or self-interest.19 In this power-as-possession 
and politics-as-attribute view, power and politics are understood as existing beyond, 
and impervious to, processes of interpretation and social construction. What this 
assumption misses, in our view, is the ability to understand how accounts, defined as 
“discursive constructions of reality that ... describe or explain the world and thus 
make it meaningful, play a role in shaping who or what is seen as ‘powerful’ or 
‘political’.20 Political allegiances, motives and forces are conceptualised as objective 
entities that both the practitioner and researcher can observe. For example, in 
Jarzabkowski and Wilson’s study of strategy in a University, the authors assert that 
 6 
one committee in their study “is a Committee which has a lot of power”, leading to 
high levels of political influence, and that “faculties are relatively weak structures”, 
leading to low levels of political ‘sway’. From a practice perspective, the power (or 
weakness) of certain sub-units and the concomitant level of political influence, 
should, in our view, be studied as part of the situated practice of the practitioners 
themselves – as actively made sense of, and oriented to, as powerful (or not) - rather 
than abstractly stated as a ‘fact’ by the researcher.21  
The perspective we advance here has similarities to the work of Maitlis and 
Lawrence, who advance the SAP field by bringing “the interplay of organizational 
discourse and politics” together.22 However, our perspective is distinct in one 
important respect. Maitlis and Lawrence retain a sharp distinction between the two 
elements, for example when they claim to have identified “four identifiable stages, 
two of which are primarily political and two of which are primarily discursive.”22 For 
us, this separation is theoretically limiting. From our perspective, power and politics 
should not be separated from discursive processes of language-use. It is not just that 
language can have power effects and can be used for political ends,
23 
but also that 
language is the primary medium through which the ‘politics of meaning’ occurs.24 
Our approach therefore focuses on the role of accounts in the “discursive construction 
of reality”, which, for us, includes the reality of the power landscape and political 
terrain of the organization.
25
 These accounts, we suggest, enable strategists to address 
practical questions such as “who has power?” and “what political agendas are at 
play?”  
Our approach is distinct in that it does not seek to provide academic theories 
that postulate answer to these questions – as per existing theories of power26 - but 
rather to provide a different kind of theory that is inspired by ethnomethodology: a 
theory of how strategists themselves bring interpretive procedures to bear on these 
questions, in their everyday practices of strategy-talk. For ethnomethodology, 
academic sociological theories of power and politics are “second-order constructs”: 
they are academic constructs of lay-member constructs.
27
 They rely upon (are built 
from) but also typically gloss over the members’ methods for making sense of 
situations.  Ethnomethodology, then, seeks to make these original ‘first-order 
constructs’ (i.e. the sensemaking of members) the topic of study. Members engage in 
their own “practical sociological reasoning”, as Garfinkel called it, which should be, 
for the ethnomethodologist at least, the focus of analysis. Language and social 
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interaction, then, is the key medium through which members make, and display, their 
own sociological reasoning: such as reasoning about power and politics in our case. It 
is to the issue of discourse that we now turn.
28
 
 
 
Discursive Perspectives on Strategy 
For a long time, scholars and practitioners alike have noticed that senior managers 
spend much of their day communicating. The so-called ‘linguistic turn’ has gone 
hand-in-hand with the ‘practice turn’ in management and organization studies. Hence, 
it is no surprise that discourse features as a key theme in SAP research.
29
 However, 
there are distinct bodies of work subsumed within the general term ‘discourse’. Those 
inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, such as Knights and Morgan and Ezzamel 
and Willmott, examine discourse as a system of thought that creates certain subjects 
and objects, with attendant power effects upon those who take up the subject positions 
it offers.
30
 ‘Discourse’ is thus conceived as “a set of ideas and practices which 
condition our ways of relating to, and acting upon, a particular phenomenon”.31 
“Discourse in the Foucauldian sense is less about everyday linguistic interaction, and 
more about historically developed systems of ideas that forms institutionalized and 
authoritative ways of addressing a topic”. 32 Knights and Morgan describe the 
disciplinary effects of the discourse of ‘strategy’, as it provides managers with 
rationalisations for their actions that enhances and sustains the exercise of managerial 
power.
33
 Alvesson and Kärreman use the term Discourse with a capital ‘D’ - and later 
Paradigm-type Discourse Studies (PDS) - to characterise the Foucauldian approach to 
discourse analysis, with its emphasis on the “general and prevalent systems for the 
formation and articulation of ideas in a particular period of time … functioning as a 
powerful ordering force”.34 
Power is also a central theme for scholars adopting a Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) framework following Fairclough, which is underpinned by a critical 
realist ontology that locates discourse within established ‘real’ social structures. For 
example, Vaara and Monin examine the discursive processes of legitimation in a post-
merger organization, focusing on the role of discourse in the exercise and legitimation 
of power.
35
 Thus, while discourse is studied at a more micro-level than the 
Foucauldian tradition, in terms of the linguistic features of specific texts, power is 
viewed as an extra-discursive component of ‘real’ social structures that exist 
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regardless of how they are discursively constructed. In other words, discourse is 
viewed as a medium through which power is exercised and maintained: power and 
discourse are analytically separated.
36
 It is this analytical separation which our EDA 
approach questions and to which we put forward a new perspective. Succinctly put, 
whilst for CDA “the constitutive work of discourse necessarily takes place within the 
constraints of the complex of economic, political and discoursal ideological 
structures”,37 for us “(d)iscourse … is thoroughly constitutive”.38 
Another strand of research has focussed more on the role of storytelling and 
narrative in the sensemaking process.
39
 Here, discourse is understood as the actual 
practices of language-use, rather than more abstract notions of dominant systems of 
thought in Foucauldian theory. The focus is on the role of language in authoring a 
meaningful version of events that enables strategic action to follow. A more micro-
perspective, inspired by a branch of ethnomethodology known as Conversation 
Analysis, focuses on the detailed analysis of talk-in-interaction, as strategists 
collectively formulate, turn by turn, versions of what the strategy (and the strategist) 
is or should be.
40
 Alvesson and Kärreman argue that a key advantage of this more 
micro approach, which they label discourse with a lowercase ‘d’ or Text Focussed 
Studies (TFS), is that it takes “the close-range level of discourse seriously” (by “being 
more attentive to the local social context of language use in organizations”, including 
the flexibility and variability of language-use. 
41
 
Our EDA perspective is located within this more micro TFS tradition of 
discourse analysis, particularly the body of work inspired by ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis, with its emphasis on how members (in our case strategists) 
work up versions of reality within which they can orient their actions.
42
 The central 
unit of analysis for us is the ‘account’: an utterance located within a particular 
conversational encounter that provides a particular version of the self and/or world.
43
 
Maitlis defines accounts as “discursive constructions of reality that interpret or 
explain”.44 Thus, a narrative is a type of account (where a sequence of past events is 
placed in a meaningful order in order to tell a story) but not all accounts are 
narratives: accounts can also be ‘factual’ statements, arguments, claims, suggestions, 
propositions, and so on. We follow Maitlis in viewing accounts as the central resource 
for sensemaking: 
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“As discursive constructions of reality that provide members with ordered 
representations of previously unordered external cues, accounts describe or 
explain the world and thus make it meaningful. ... Accounts are a critical 
resource that allow individuals to accomplish work and negotiate their day-to-
day lives ... constructing ordered relationships among sets of entities (events, 
people, actions, things) in ways that enable people to act or at least to decide 
to act.” 45 
 
The giving of accounts can, for example, be related to the management of 
responsibility: Sillince and Mueller, for example, found that a project team in a global 
insurance company gradually reformulated its remit in order for it to fall in line with 
the ‘achievements’ (or lack thereof) with regard to its ‘mission’, failings which were 
gradually becoming apparent.
46 
 
According to Llewellyn and Hindmarsh, the sensemaking literature is 
conspicuous for the lack of studies of “sensemaking in real time”, in the “moment by 
moment accomplishment of work”.47 Samra-Fredericks also highlights the lack of 
“fine-grained studies of everyday strategic management practice-as-interactionally-
done”.48 Our study seeks to address this issue by analysing sensemaking about power 
and politics in the real-time flow and flux of strategy meetings. We draw inspiration 
from the ethnomethodological focus on how members produce and maintain their 
social reality that enables “mutually intelligible social encounters” to proceed.49 
Samra-Fredericks refers to the “taken-for-granted methods or [] practical reasoning 
procedures for producing order that constitutes sense”, which we will here term 
‘interpretative procedures’ but are also referred to by ethnomethodologists as 
‘member’s methods’.50  
The ethnomethodological work of Samra-Fredericks has shown how 
strategists construct objects and phenomena such as ‘markets’ and ‘environments’ in 
their social interactions, acting as interpretative procedures for making sense of 
strategy.
51
 We extend Samra-Fredericks’ work by showing how power and politics 
constitute an important component of the interpretative procedures used by strategists. 
Our EDA approach also adopts a different perspective on those supposedly extra-
linguistic features, such as power structures, studied by CDA.
52
 Rather than viewing 
power and politics as something that members or organizations ‘have’ or ‘do not 
have’, as in Jarzabkowski and Wilson’s study for instance,53 we instead view power 
and politics as something that is actively oriented to, and interpreted, by members 
themselves.
54
 Hence, we propose viewing power and politics not as pre-existing 
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entities that exist ‘out there’, that actors or organizations ‘possess’, but rather focus 
the spotlight on the interpretative procedures that render them into “social facts”: as 
more or less stable possessions or attributes of actors.
55
 Our guiding principle is to 
“recover the local practices and procedures that produce local occasions of order” 
(ibid), such as the ordering of organizational actors and actions into “powerful” and 
“not powerful”, “political” and “not political”.  
 
 
Methodology, Field Site and Context 
Methodology 
Our methodology was guided by Clegg, Kornberger and Carter’s plea to “focus on the 
ethnomethods of everyday strategists”.56 This meant studying what strategists actually 
do, in real time, rather than through forms of restrospective reconstruction or 
rationalisation typical of surveys or interviews.
57
 The research was an ‘action 
research’ study conducted in the UK office of a large multi-national branded apparel 
company called Apparat (all names are pseudonyms). The research took an in-depth, 
qualitative approach in order to investigate what happens on the ground when 
strategic plans are devised and implemented. According to Tsoukas and Chia, strategy 
research requires investigation of the actual processes through which strategies are 
devised and implemented.
58
 This demands the detailed analysis of micro-episodes 
which are located within historically grounded, longitudinal, in depth, 
ethnographically engaged research.
59
 Yin mentions six possible sources of evidence: 
“documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant 
observations, physical artefacts”.60 Indeed, our study drew on the first five of these, 
albeit with a clear emphasis on participant observation (including audio recording) of 
strategy meetings.  
Through immersion in the events in Apparat over a reasonably long process, 
the research aimed to illuminate how events unfolded from the members’ perspective 
during a period of strategic change.
61
 However, our aim in this paper is not to ‘tell the 
story’ of what happened in the process of strategic change. Our EDA approach  
follows the tradition in micro approaches to discourse analysis, particularly those 
inspired by ethnomethodology (EM) and the sub-field of Conversation Analysis (CA), 
by analysing transcriptions from an audio recording of naturally occurring 
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conversation in a strategy meeting.
62
 EM and CA are critical of the tendency within 
management and organization studies to rely on empirical sources that are divorced 
from the ‘live’, ‘real time’ practices of organizational members. Audio and video 
recording of naturally occurring interaction, in contrast, offer records of ‘strategists at 
work’ that can be subject to detailed and repeated analysis.63 The reader is not 
expected to take on faith the analysts’ interpretation of ‘what happened’, but is able to 
inspect the transcript and subject it to alternative interpretations. Of course, our 
interpretation is based on the broader ‘transcript-extrinsic’ insights garnered from the 
broader ethnographic study.
64
  
EM and CA are also critical of the tendency for analysts to take segments of 
talk away from their interactional context through the ‘coding’ process. Accounts are 
taken through a series of progressively more abstracted ‘codes’ to be represented in 
the form of abstract social categories (such as power or politics for example), which 
are then used to ‘explain’ what is going on in the particular setting. EM and CA, by 
contrast, examine how members make sense of the setting for themselves, within the 
setting and in ways that are visibly observable to each other. The warrant for this shift 
in analytic focus is simple: it is members own sensemaking, not the analyst’s post-hoc 
process of sensemaking whilst ‘coding data’, that is consequential for the practical 
activities they are undertaking, and therefore demands analytical attention. The 
analyst may think he or she has ‘seen’ an instance of power or politics, but unless 
members themselves also demonstrably orient to, and make sense of, the event in the 
same way it should not be ‘coded’ as such. Moreover, the point is not just to put 
behaviour or accounts into abstract ‘codes’ which are then used to ‘explain’ what 
happened and why, but rather to show how social facts such as ‘power’ or ‘politics’ 
are methodically used by members to accomplish organization.  
 
The Study ‘Site’ 
The research was conducted by two ‘action’ researchers – Barry and Jeremy - within 
the UK subsidiary of Apparat, a multi-national apparel company. Within its ‘sector’, 
Apparat-UK lies third in terms of national market share, behind two other global 
brands, with annual sales revenue of approximately £250m. Due to the confidentiality 
agreement between the researchers and the organisation, Apparat is employed as a 
pseudonym in order to protect the anonymity of the firm and individuals involved. 
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The research project was formed following a discussion at a business awards 
dinner between the Apparat UK MD and the Dean of the Management School where 
Barry worked. A plan was devised to construct a ‘strategic change’ action research 
project that involved two academics (who also lectured at the Management School 
part-time) who would act as ‘change agents’. We use the term ‘action researcher’ 
rather than ‘researcher’ here deliberately to emphasise the active participative role 
played by Barry and Jeremy, which actually came closer to ‘management consultant’. 
Both researchers had years of industry experience as managers before they decided to 
become academics, and their role was explicitly framed as one of intervention rather 
than observation. 
  In terms of research ethics, a formal ethical agreement was signed, with 
guarantees around anonymity and the protection of commercially sensitive 
information. On an individual level, all participants in the Steering Group had given 
full consent to participate in the study, consent for the use of the tape recorder at the 
meetings, and assurances of anonymity, confidentiality and the right to withdraw 
before the Steering Group meetings began.  
At the time of the study, Apparat UK was facing a difficult market situation 
and was under serious pressure from its Global HQ to improve its short run financial 
performance. Though Apparat UK’s sales volume had been reasonably stable, their 
average product selling price had degraded substantially in recent years. As a result, 
profitability was in serious decline, despite the drastic cost saving measures that had 
been taken in response. Apparat UK’s retail customer base had also consolidated 
dramatically in the recent past as smaller retailers had withdrawn from the market. 
The ‘action research’ project was designed to bring about radical change to the Key 
Account Management practices of the company. The first stage involved establishing 
a cross-functional account development team comprised of appropriate managers 
from across the different functions. An overview of all the fieldwork conducted is 
given in Table 1.  
 
---- Insert Table 1 here ----  
 
For the purposes of this paper, we draw on data from the cross-functional account 
development team detailed in the second row of Table 1 (hereafter referred to as 
simply the “Steering Group”). The remit of the Steering Group was to develop a 
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comprehensive and detailed Account Development Strategy for one of the key 
accounts. A potentially radical overhaul of the company’s current way of working 
was proposed. The ‘lead’ action researcher (Barry) acted as facilitator-chairman of the 
Steering Group. The second action researcher (Jeremy) acted as a non-participant 
observer of the Steering Group’s formal sessions and a participant observer of the 
sub-teams they deployed. Both action researchers acted as ‘change agents’ within the 
organization, adopting what Gummesson refers to as a ‘manager for hire’ role.65 The 
change-agent work was delivered pro-bono in return for access to collect data for 
research purposes.  
The availability of powerful mobile digital recording devices has transformed 
the process analysing audio empirical material captured during participant and non-
participant observation. This is a particularly serendipitous development given, as 
Boden comments: “For managers talk is the work”.66 Hundreds of hours of ‘talk’ were 
captured and, as a result, the study directly responds to Samra-Fredericks’ call for 
research that comprises “ .... ethnographies which are extended to include audio 
recordings of the naturally occurring talk-based interactive routines of managers over 
a period of time”.67 The tape recording we analyse below is taken from the first 
meeting of the steering group, led by Barry, shortly before Jeremy started on the 
project.  
 
Making Sense of Politics  
The extract that follows (see Table 2) is taken from the first meeting of the Steering 
Group. The action researcher – Barry – is explaining the findings of the first phase of 
the action research project: the semi-structured interviews that comprised the 
“Illuminative Evaluation” (row 5 in Table 1 above). Quotes from the interviews are 
displayed on the projector screen, as Barry narrates what he thinks these interview 
quotes mean: what issues the business currently faces, and what should be done about 
them? 
 
 ---- Insert Table 2 here ---- 
 
The extract displayed in Table 2 shows that power and politics were employed 
as a ‘reasoning device’ or ‘interpretive procedure’ through which the group makes 
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sense of a variety of issues: What are interviewees saying? Why are they saying what 
they are saying? What problems do we have as a business? Why do we have these 
problems? What can we do as a group? How should we influence the strategic 
agenda? Who has the power to block us? Who has the power to help us? What are the 
political implications of pursuing certain courses of action?  
In the analysis that follows (see Table 3 for a summary overview), we shall 
explore how power and politics were used as sensemaking devices in three distinct 
practical topics of the interaction: (1) the process of defining the strategy ‘problem’, 
(2) the process of talking about the ‘problem’, and (3) deciding what can be done 
about the ‘problem’.  
 
Part 1: What is the problem? 
Barry’s reasoning at the beginning of this extract (Lines 1-7) is that the problems in 
the company – particularly around ‘hanging things together for the customer’ (i.e. 
ensuring customers get a good quality product and service from the company) – stem 
from the “political situation at Board level” (Line 4). Politics, then, from our EDA 
perspective, is not a “social fact” that is behind-the-scenes activity, or a cognitive 
process that informs action, that is simply revealed in language. Language is not 
viewed as a source of information about the social world.
68
 Rather, language is here 
constitutive of the very social reality it describes. As Coulon states, 
ethnomethodology allows us to study how “ordinary language tells the social reality, 
describes it, and constitutes it at the same time”.69 In our case, politics serves as an 
interpretive procedure through which the group can make sense of – and decide what 
to do about – the ‘problems’ that the company is currently facing. More specifically, it 
can also be a device to accuse (someone of having political motives), exclude (from a 
group to which they might have belonged), shift responsibility to a group and so on. 
The term “departmentalism” (Line 17) also invokes an idea about current strategy as 
driven by Board members “defending their turf”, rather than focussing on what is 
‘good for the customer’.70 
By making sense of the current situation in terms of ‘politics’, the group builds 
a set of understandings that provide the platform for future strategic action – we 
should do something to fix this ‘political problem at Board level’, but because we 
cannot trust the Board to put aside their political agendas we should undertake the 
change process ourselves. Politics as an interpretive procedure thus provides not only 
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a “definition of the situation” (i.e. what is going on here) but also a practical decision-
making method that generates a recipe for action (i.e. what should we do about it).
71
 
Alternative ways of making sense – such as making sense of the problem as one of 
lack of resources, or lack of information, or indeed as not actually a problem in the 
first place (‘we have no real issues with the customer’), would thus lead to different 
courses of strategic action: we need more resources from global HQ, we need better 
information systems, or we need to do nothing at all. As an interpretive procedure, 
politics directs strategic attention towards not only ‘potential solutions to the problem’ 
but ‘the nature of the problem’ itself: this is not a ‘problem of resources’, or a 
‘problem of information’, but rather a ‘problem of politics’.  
 
Part 2: The politics of talking about politics  
Lines 21-26 display a different kind of ‘political sensitivity’: awareness of the politics 
of their talk itself. This kind of talk is referred to in the communications literature as 
meta-communication: talk about talk.
72
 It is where speakers talk about how they 
would like their own talk to be understood. “What I mean is...”, “I’m only joking”, 
“Don’t take this the wrong way...”. Barry makes a point of stating that his prior 
criticisms of the Board, and particularly Adam, for being ‘political’ should be read as 
just “an impression” (as opposed to, say, a ‘truth’) and should not be read as a 
personal criticism (“it’s no insult to Adam it’s the way it is”, Line 22-23). Barry had 
some background knowledge of the Steering Group members from the months he had 
already spent in the company, but many questions about politics remained. Did one of 
the Steering Group members have a political allegiance with any of the board 
members? Would someone ‘report back’ the less-than-favourable assessments Barry 
had made of them, jeopardising the entire project? Hence, ‘couching’ his talk as just 
an “impression” and not an “insult” - what Conversational Analysts refer to as a 
‘disclaimer’ - helps to mitigate any negative political repercussions from his talk.73 
‘It’s no insult, it’s the way it is’ is very similar to ‘the police are only human if they 
lashed out’: by attaching certain descriptions, the recipient of this account is invited 
not to interpret a certain action as wrong.
74
 The action in question is not accountably 
wrong, rather, it is natural.  
Moreover, as a ‘change agent’, Barry had to ensure that his own actions were 
not read as political. Interpretive procedures were used not only to make sense of 
organizational reality, but also to render his own account ‘accountable’. Calling a 
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person or group ‘political’ is itself an act that can be read as (or dismissed as) 
political: an act of deflecting blame, scape-goating, attacking, defending your own 
reputation. Because people “treat reports and descriptions as if they come from groups 
and individuals with interests, desires, ambitions and stake in some versions of what 
the world is like”, accounts can easily be discounted on these grounds.75 The Steering 
Group members could well have been wondering if Barry had his own ‘allegiances’ 
with certain power-bases at Board level. In other words, accusing others of being 
political leaves you open to the charge that you yourself are politically motivated: 
‘you are only saying that because you have a grudge, a vendetta, an ambition’ or ‘you 
want to undermine his power and influence to put forward your own sectional 
agenda’. Stating that his prior talk is not “an insult” handles this potential charge 
carefully: it implies that Barry’s criticisms are for ‘good’, ‘honest’, ‘a-political’ 
reasons [wanting to make positive changes to help the business], not for ‘bad’, 
‘devious’, ‘political’, ‘underhand’ reasons [wanting to undermine Adam’s reputation 
or influence]. Barry is thus inviting the group to make sense of his account as not 
politically-motivated. Strategy practice, we propose, involves seeking legitimacy by 
carefully framing your own past, present and future actions (including your own talk, 
in this case) as ‘a-political’ or at least ‘sensitive to politics’.76  
Barry then tells the group that he has removed the last two pages of the report 
[based on the interviews he has conducted] because they are “about the Directors 
talking about themselves” (Lines 24-26). He justifies this action by invoking politics 
as a reasoning device: “because it’s so political, a hot potato” (Line 26). This reflexive 
formulation has striking resemblance to the classic ethnomethodological study by 
Weider of a halfway house for rehabilitating offenders.
77 
Residents who were asked to 
report the illegal activities of other residents replied with “You know I can’t snitch”. 
For Weider, avowing a motive by invoking a social rule or norm for ‘not talking’ 
(which he calls the ‘Convict Code’) acts as a way of displaying (accounting for) the 
meaning of social action, by appealing to a set of social norms, rules, codes, motives 
etc that accounts for the current action (not talking).  
In our case, invoking politics performs the same kind of accountability. First, 
the label ‘political’ provides an account (justification) for the action researcher’s own 
present actions, namely justifying why certain pieces of information have been 
withheld from the group. It presents the action researcher as somebody who is not 
devious or manipulative, but rather simply someone who is just being sensitive to the 
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political terrain of the firm. Second, the label ‘political’ is also used to justify why he 
feels they as a group should address the issue: because it is a “hot potato” topic. The 
term ‘political’, then, is used to steer certain issues onto the agenda, and categorize 
them in particular ways: “A central feature of any description is its role in 
categorization; a description formulates some object or event as something; it 
constitutes it as a thing, and a thing with specific qualities”, in this case as a ‘political’ 
issue.
78
 Other categories could have been employed and would have performed other 
actions: instead of politics, ethics could have been invoked; or rules and regulations; 
or instrumental rationality. Thus, alternative descriptions would have achieved 
alternative performances. The indexical (context-dependent) nature of such appeals to 
social norms, rules, types or forces (in our case, norms around the politics of 
information) is also important for our EDA perspective. Had the phrase “I have 
removed the last two pages of the report” uttered by the action researcher to, say, 
managers from a competitor firm, it would probably be understood through an 
alternative interpretive device: for instance, a confidentiality agreement around 
commercially sensitive information. Thus, from our perspective, politics is not an 
objective social force but rather part of the interpretive process of making and 
displaying the meaning of social conduct. 
Whilst some see formulations – the description or ‘framing’ of a certain issue 
or topic - as typically “the prerogative of the powerful”, for us such a categorical 
assertion is unhelpful.
79
 What should be done is to analyse the role formulations play 
as part of specific discursive actions. Accounting for certain things in certain ways is 
a way of doing certain things, and making social action account-able, such as blaming 
(others), excusing (oneself), justifying (one’s past actions).80 For instance, the way 
that Barry described his ‘findings’ from his interviews with the Board of Directors is 
interesting precisely because they are framed as ‘a-political’ (Lines 27-45). By 
describing the Directors as critical of themselves, Barry implies that their self-
reflections in the interviews were, on this occasion, valid and truthful accounts (“they 
were being honest”, “tough on themselves”) – not politically motivated accounts 
designed to pass the buck, build power-bases or play political battles. Thus, politics 
acts as an interpretive procedure for enabling members to decide what is true and 
false, objective or subjective, factual and fabricated. Just as researchers have their 
own ‘methodology’ for going about collecting, categorising and making inferences 
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and conclusions from ‘data’, so do members of other setting, such as strategists in this 
case. In short, then, politics is a lay methodology.   
Barry also talks about the potential political implications of this information 
itself (that the Board are not “hanging together as a team”, see Lines 42-45) through 
another instance of meta-communication, the need to keep the information private 
(“keep this round the table”, Line 45-46). Both Barry and Sandra talk about the 
political sensitivity of this information. Barry acknowledges that it could do some 
political damage to senior management (“that’s not a signal you want out in the 
business”, Line 46-47). Sandra’s phrase “they’d allow us to say it as well I think” 
(Line 51) alludes to the idea that she recognises the political sensitivity of the 
information: whether or not the Board would ‘allow’ them to talk about the problems 
at Board level publicly. This phrase discursively allocates power to the Board, who 
are vested with the assumed power to ‘allow’ or ‘disallow’ something to be said, and 
presumably to mete out powerful consequences (loss of job, status, influence, future 
promotions and so on) to those who say something publicly without ‘being allowed’. 
Hence, we see here again that politics provides the methodology through which the 
members make practical decisions about what can and cannot be said or done.  
Overall, the interaction addresses a series of practical concerns about what the 
members, as change agents, think are the political implications of talking about 
politics: Could what I am saying be read as an ‘insult’ and therefore do political 
damage? Should we interpret the accounts of others as politically motivated or honest 
and apolitical? Should certain information be treated as too political to be voiced ‘in 
public’? These questions, as we have sought to demonstrate in our analysis, should 
not be analysed as cognitive processes that inform strategists’ sensemaking, but rather 
as part of the public, i.e. discursive, sensemaking process itself.
81
 It was through 
discourse that what could or should be said about the ‘problem’ was established.82    
To sum up, what this extract shows is how interpretive procedures are used, as 
lay methods, to categorize certain issues or pieces of information into a social order: 
‘too politically sensitive to be shared widely’, ‘politically sensitive but permitted to be 
discussed’, ‘politically sensitive but not dangerous to us’, ‘not politically sensitive’ 
and so on. These procedures have action consequences, for example, justifying the 
inclusion or exclusion of certain decisions, people and lines of action.
83
  
 
Part 3: What should we do? 
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In Lines 52-61, Barry puts forward his rationale for choosing not to implement the 
change program with the Board of Directors. Politics again operates as the central 
interpretive method. The Board, he reasons, are too heavily steeped in power and 
politics to make it effective: “fixed positions”, “history”, people with “too much to 
lose and not enough to gain”. In contrast, the current Steering Group membership is 
framed as relatively ‘apolitical’. The vested interests that Barry does attribute to the 
Steering Group are framed as beneficial to the change process: they have plenty to 
gain from pushing the change forward but nothing to lose (“everybody round this 
table has got a lot to gain from doing this”, “it’s very low risk”, Lines 58-59): a stake 
is attributed to them which is politically useful, for the change process at least. The 
action researcher then frames his own political relationship by offering himself up as 
a political scapegoat: “you can blame me if anything goes wrong” (Lines 59-61). He 
also denies a vested (financial) interest (“I’m not being paid”, Line 61) and declares a 
vested (research) interest: I will still stand to gain from this as a research opportunity 
even if the change process itself ‘fails’ (Lines 59--64). He positions himself as not a 
‘consultant’ and therefore as having less of a stake and vested interest in the process: 
he has nothing personally to lose in terms of risking his client relationship or future 
fee income. This talk shows that strategy practice involves directing others towards 
‘reading’ and ‘making sense of’ the political motives of the speaker as well as those 
spoken about.    
Barry’s “plan [of action]” (Lines 66-73) takes great care to emphasise that it 
will be the group, not the action researcher as an individual, who will present their 
radical new change proposal to the Board. Why is the action researcher at pains to 
discuss who will present the plan? The action researcher orients towards the change 
proposal as a political and ‘risky’ manoeuvre: this process could do some damage to 
your reputation, your status in the organization, perhaps even affect your job. People 
rarely check whether others are “comfortable” (Line 72) with doing something that is 
politically neutral, or politically advantageous, or simply routine, action. The use of 
such terms as “comfortable” provides the context through which members are invited 
to make sense of the situation: ‘this is a politically sensitive decision’. Hence, the 
action researcher’s caution serves to reinforce the idea that their change plan is 
potentially a politically dangerous manoeuvre. This sensemaking process is, in our 
view, not simply a trivial matter. Rather, we view sensemaking about politics as an 
integral part of strategy practice. Making sense of a strategic change plan as 
 20 
“politically risky”, for instance, has implications for who is likely to get involved, 
what they are likely to say or do, and what the outcome is likely to be. Indeed, as 
Maitlis suggests, viewing something as “political” or “sensitive” radically changes 
how actors proceed with their strategizing activities.
84
  
Barry alludes to this very idea when he reassures the group that they should 
not “worry” about presenting their strategic change plan because the Board of 
Directors already have “confidence” in the group (Line 77-79). Barry displays his 
understanding that the group could have some concern about the political implications 
of this action, but guides them to interpret this concern as unfounded. Politics, he 
suggests, is not a blockage to their change process – rather, they actually have 
political support from the Board. Barry and Sara then co-author a picture of the firm 
as ‘surprisingly non-political’ (Lines 80-96) at all levels - aside perhaps from the 
Board, which is described as “intense” in micro-politics. They discuss a Competitor 
firm, which two of the members previously worked for, as an ‘intensely political’ 
arena, plagued with “secret meetings” (Line 89) and an atmosphere which made 
people “scared to voice an opinion” (Line 93-94). The group attempt to make sense of 
what opportunities they have from working in a largely ‘apolitical’ firm. This seems 
to galvanise the group into action, giving them a sense of optimism about their ability 
to implement the proposed change.  
Table 3 gives an overview of the analysis provided above, identifying the 
accounts through which politics was used as an interpretive procedure during the 
practical work of strategic decision-making. As Table 3 shows, politics was a key 
interpretive procedure used by the Steering Group to make sense of past actions (e.g. 
what did people tell me in the interviews), present actions (e.g. why am I telling you 
this now) and future actions (e.g. what should we do to fix this problem).  
 
---- Insert Table 3 here ---- 
 
To summarise, our analysis of this extract shows how the strategists frame the 
change process itself as (a) politically dangerous for the Board, (b) politically 
beneficial for the Steering Group, (c) politically neutral for the action researcher, and 
(d) politically easy to implement given the comparatively low level of political 
behaviour in the firm. The sensemaking process can be summarized as follows: 
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1. There is a problem in this company, and that problem is politics. 
2. The Board cannot sort out the problem because they are the source of the 
political problem. 
3. You (the Steering Group) are best placed to sort out the problem because you 
are not embroiled in politics. 
4. To be successful, you must be sensitive to the political implications of certain 
information, including this very discussion about politics that we are currently 
having. 
5. You have political support at senior levels, a political scapegoat if you should 
need one (i.e. the change agent) and a ‘leader’ (i.e. the change agent) with no 
ulterior political motive or allegiances to support you. This should encourage 
you to embark upon a change initiative. 
6. Below the Board of Directors level, this company is actually less political than 
many others. This should encourage you to embark upon a change initiative. 
 
Power and politics, then, provide the interpretive method through which 
decisions about what the strategic change process should look like: Who should be 
involved? Who should be excluded? How they should proceed? Should they even 
proceed at all? As strategy-makers, then, the group are collectively building a shared 
sense of what the power-bases and political agendas in the firm are, and what it could 
mean for their attempts to shape the strategic agenda. The issue of politics is taken 
away from the speaker and is made “part of what is described”.85 Politics is 
represented as existing ‘out there’ rather than existing in the descriptions provided. 
Strategy is itself framed as a process of finding out about, and navigating, the power 
struggles and political battles in the firm. What our analysis shows is that the question 
of who has power, and who has what political agenda, is not simply something that 
people ‘bring into the room’. Rather, it is an outcome of the strategy sensemaking 
process and, as such, a central part of the practice of ‘strategy-making’ itself.  
 
 
 
Discussion 
The extensive body of work on strategic sensemaking by Andrew Brown is especially 
relevant to our discussion because it, like us, adopts an interpretivist perspective on 
power and politics.
86
 At first glance, his work seems similar to ours, focussing as it 
does on sensemaking, discourse and narrative. Hence, it might be useful to look more 
closely at how our approach differs from Brown’s work. In his study of the 
implementation of a new IT system in a hospital, Brown conducted interviews with 
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major stakeholders.
87
 Power and politics emerged as a key theme in some of these 
interview narratives. For instance, the Chief Information Officer attributes the 
resistance to change amongst doctors to their fear of loss of power and control over 
elements such as waiting lists.
88
 Brown views this account as evidence of underlying 
social forces of power and politics at work, such as struggles over control and 
preservation of self-interest. Brown uses these interview extracts to conclude that the 
change process was indeed, as the CIO described, marred with “micro-political 
game[s]”, “power relations”, “personal reputations” and “political interests”.89 Again, 
in Brown’s study of strategic change in a confectionery company the analysis 
proceeds by using the interview quotes as evidence that the change process was 
dominated by power and politics, as actors sought to pursue their “self-interested 
goals”, further their “personal agendas” , and protect their “position power”.90 
 Brown’s system of analysis can be understood using Woolgar's classic work 
on the 'splitting' and 'inversion' process used in the construction of scientific 
knowledge.
91
 This process also - and importantly for our purposes - includes social 
scientific reasoning about the nature of social reality. Woolgar argues that truth-
claims are made through a series of five progressive steps: 
 
 
(1) Document  
(2) Document  Object 
(3) Document      Object [independent existence] 
(4) Document  Object 
(5) Deny (or forget about) stages 1-3.92 
 
Here, the ‘document’ refers to the interview accounts in Brown’s studies (such 
as the CIO’s claim that politics was the cause of resistance to change), and the 
‘object’ refers to the notion of ‘politics’ as an objective social reality or ‘force’. We 
can represent these analytical ‘moves’ employed by Brown as follows: 
 
(1) CIO interview account 
(2) CIO interview account  Political motive of clinicians 
(3) CIO interview account      Political motive of clinicians [independent existence] 
(4) CIO interview account  Political motive of clinicians 
(5) Deny (or forget about) stages 1-3.93 
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For Brown, the document (interview account) is used to infer the existence of 
an external social reality (the existence of politics). Brown applies these five 
analytical ‘moves’ by invoking the existence of an objective, external social reality 
(comprised of political forces) that is regarded as independent of the document. 
Competing accounts, then, such as an account by doctors that it is not ‘politics’ that 
motivates their resistance but rather a concern for the welfare of patients, are 
problematic because they present a ‘realist dilemma’: who is right?94 This dilemma 
can be resolved by sorting accounts into those that provide an objective account of 
‘reality’  - which are taken through stages (1) to (5) above – and, and those which are 
misguided, misperceptions, biased, erroneous or otherwise false accounts – which are 
thus left at Stage (1) above (just a ‘document’ with no underlying ‘reality’). Thus, 
clinician’s accounts are treated as follows: 
 
(1) Clinician’s interview accounts 
[Stages (2) to (5) not applied] 
 
In short, the job of the analyst is presented as one of “sorting” through 
competing accounts to decide which are ‘true’ and which are ‘false’. The analyst 
thereby adopts the role of ‘judge’ or ‘adjudicator’ of the accounts which he or she 
encounters (or generates) in the research process. Table 4 provides an overview of 
how this method of analytical reasoning is employed in Brown’s study.95 ---- Table 4 
here --- 
 
 
Interestingly, politics is one such method - amongst a range of other ‘human 
factors’ - for conducting this very sorting process.96 The analyst claims that some 
accounts are politically motivated (and therefore a false representation) and others are 
not (and therefore a true representation). The introduction of ‘human factors’ such as 
understandings, perceptions, biases, allegiances, interests and motives is a common-
place and established (‘professional’ social scientific and ‘lay’) method through which 
the factuality of a claim [the existence of an object independent of the document] is 
undermined or rejected (ibid). This is exactly the move that Brown makes when he 
claims that the notion of ‘patient care’ was merely a “smokescreen” that was 
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motivated by a fear of loss of control and autonomy amongst some “highly resistant 
groups”. 97 Doctor’s account’s (that they have legitimate concerns about patient care) 
are relativized, while manager’s accounts (doctors have self-interested concerns about 
loss of power and control) are not.  Similarly, in his study of strategic change in a 
confectionery company, certain accounts are dismissed as “a facade to mask the 
expression of personal and political prejudices” [i.e. Stage (1) only], whilst others 
(noteably, accounts that include reference to power and politics) are treated as sources 
of information about ‘what really happened’ [i.e. Stages (1) – (5)].98 The same kind of 
analytical separation is also found in other approaches to sensemaking and 
power/politics.
99
 
What difference does it make to adopt our ethnomethodologically-informed 
discourse analysis (EDA) perspective on politics, to view politics as “participant’s 
discursive concerns”?100 Brown, like other sensemaking scholars, ‘reads’ his 
interview texts as evidence of an underlying social reality, a reality in which certain 
actors (clinicians) have certain properties (political motives) that drive their 
behaviour, laying claim to an objective social reality comprised of political forces. 
Our perspective, in contrast, regards accounts as constitutive of the social world, not 
sources of information about it. We view the interview text, or any other interaction 
for that matter, as accounts that are part of situated social practice. This involves 
studying the epistemic (knowledge-producing) and performative (i.e. performing 
social actions) functions of accounts – paying attention to the document itself as a 
topic of study in its own right, without using it to invoke the existence of an objective 
social reality.
101
 We would instead study how accounts operate epistemically, as they 
construct the mind/world (for instance, as a world comprised of political forces and 
self-interested motives), and how they are used to do things, to perform social actions 
within a specific social situation (such as answering an interviewer’s question, 
presenting a plausible account, discounting rival versions, or deflecting blame and 
responsibility for a ‘failed’ IT project). Table 5 provides an overview of how such an 
EDA analysis might proceed in relation to Brown’s study of an IT system in a 
hospital discussed above.
102
 
 
--- Table 5 here --- 
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Competing accounts (alternative ‘documents’), then, are no longer problematic 
from our EDA perspective. EDA is thus a ‘symmetrical’ form of: all accounts are 
treated in the same analytical manner, none are privileged as more ‘true’ or 
‘objective’ or ‘accurate’ or ‘complete’ than any other analysis.103 Our approach does 
not seek to find “non-social, non-constructionist ways of underwriting knowledge 
claims” by claiming to have found an “irrefutable, just-so, non-descriptive description 
of reality”.104 Rather, we instead focus the analytical lens on how “knowledge and 
reality are cultural categories, elements of discourse, invented, used, and defended 
within social practices”.105 This involves treating all versions of reality as “particular, 
discursive, socially occasioned productions”.106 For example, conflicting accounts 
between the CIO and doctors no longer need to be ‘sorted’ into true and false, but 
rather can be examined for the epistemic and performative work they achieve. In the 
context of a strategy meeting, for instance, an account similar to that given by the CIO 
(“doctors are resisting for political reasons”) could be employed to undermine rival 
accounts, discredit opposition to the IT project and push the change agenda forward. 
An alternative account - say “our objections are not politically motivated but driven 
by a concern for patient safety” - could, if widely accepted, completely discredit the 
IT project itself and lead to it being abandoned. What Brown’s system of analysis 
misses, along with other sensemaking studies, and what our approach provides, is a 
lens for studying the epistemic (world-building) and performative (social action 
performing) capacity of discourse. 
 
Conclusion 
The field of strategy-as-practice (SAP) has come a long way in helping us to 
understand the micro aspects of discursive processes of formulating, creating, 
modifying, adapting, defending, pushing, adjusting, withdrawing (and so on) 
proposals for strategic change. However, the SAP field has recently, and in our view 
justifiably, been criticized for its lack of attention to issues of power and politics. 
According to Clegg, Carter and Kornberger, “understanding of strategy necessitates 
an engagement with power and politics.”106 In this paper, we have sought to address 
this seeming “illegitimacy of power” as a form of analysis in mainstream management 
studies, by examining how power and politics were deployed as an interpretive 
procedure in the sensemaking of strategy meetings.
107 
Our study shows that taking an 
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EDA perspective can show the methods through which members make strategic 
decisions and handle strategic issues, including issues of who or what has ‘power’ and 
‘politics’.  
The insights illuminated by this study are also potentially valuable for 
practitioners, who need to deal with the political dimension of strategic change in 
their work.
108
 In a recent review of the key themes and concerns of articles published 
in Long Range Planning, Cummings and Daellenbach noted a trend towards 
“strategists becoming more politically astute in their practice”; indeed, they call for 
more research into the “strategist-as-politician”.109 This paper meets this call but takes 
theorising down a different path, viewing politics as an interpretive resource rather 
than a pre-existing social force. To illustrate the practical implications of the 
interpretive procedures we describe, let us consider for a moment what may have 
happened if the Steering Group had made sense of the situation in a different way. If 
the Board had been interpreted as too powerful and too politically unsupportive, the 
steering group members could well have decided not to pursue their chosen change 
agenda, or pursue it in a different way. Alternatively, if the Board had been 
interpreted as powerful but politically supportive, the Steering Group could have 
decided to pursue a much more radical agenda, safe in the knowledge that they had 
the ‘weight’ and ‘backing’ of the Board behind them – or perhaps even invite the 
Board to come onboard jointly with them. Alternatively again, if they had interpreted 
the Board as politically unsupportive but lacking in a substantive power base, the 
Steering Group could have felt confident to pursue their change agenda, regardless of 
any political repercussions at Board level. Hence, our analysis suggests that talk about 
politics is not ‘just talk’, it is constitutive of the very organizational reality that it 
describes and is central to the very practical work of strategic decision-making.  
This study provides several key contributions to the understanding of power 
and politics in the Strategy as Practice field. Firstly, our study contributes to but also 
critiques the emerging SAP community, which has made some progress in 
introducing sociological theory to the field of strategy.
110
 Whilst SAP has opened 
strategy to a broader field of debate, according to Clegg, Carter and Kornberger issues 
of power and politics have yet to be seriously researched and theorised.
111
 Our 
contribution is to go beyond existing work that shows that sensemaking is a political 
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and power-laden process, by showing that sensemaking is central to the interpretation 
of strategic actors and strategic action as political and power-laden.
112
  
Many of the key contributions to the SAP literature, such as Jarzabkowski, 
adopt a structurationist-realist rather than a discursive-constitutive perspective.
113
 
From our EDA perspective, this misses the constitutive role of language. We find it 
problematic to assert the existence of political forces as pre-existing objective social 
facts, as Jarzabkowski suggests by describing the “authority relationships involved in 
mobilizing power, which are reflected in the way that the interests of different groups 
are represented within a social system”, without showing how these “social facts” are 
reproduced (and reified) in the ongoing interaction of members.
114 
For us, this kind of 
analysis “presupposes the existence of an outside signifying world that exists 
independent of social interaction” and fails to study how the social world is, in fact, 
the “continuous accomplishment of the actors”.115 Following the process perspective 
in organization theory, we view actors as not simply having political motives or 
agendas – as if these were stable and objective properties or attributes.116 Rather, we 
view power and politics as more or less stable and more or less shared understandings 
that are generated within interpretive sensemaking processes. The strategy as practice 
field needs an EDA approach, we suggest, to study these processes. A picture of the 
power and politics of the organizational landscape is not simply ‘already there’ for 
everyone to see: it must be built.
117
 Indeed, it is often precisely the ambiguity of 
strategic situations – the existence of multiple possible interpretations of ‘what is 
going on?’ and ‘what should we do?’ – which makes these discursive processes of 
meaning-making so important for strategy practice.
118
  
We agree with Shotter and Cunliffe’s view that a central task of managers is to 
create “intelligible formulations” of “where we are now and where we might go 
next”.119 These formulations, developed in dialogue with others, work to give “shape 
and direction to the actions of other participants in the organization”.120 Our 
contribution has been to show how power and politics are used as interpretive 
procedures for making strategic decisions about “what should we do” and “how 
should we do it”. This interpretive process involves generating, through dialogue with 
others, intelligible formulations around questions such as: will other organizational 
actors seek to block the strategy? What political motives or agendas are driving their 
behaviour? What power do they have to steer or stall the implementation process? 
Both the content and process of strategy can be radically altered when actors are 
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interpreted as too powerful, or too political, to make the strategy viable. This 
sensemaking process also applies to the strategists themselves. What power do we 
have to implement this strategy? What political allegiances could we develop to help 
in this process? In the end, our group built a picture of the Board as powerful and 
political but ultimately not enough of a threat to abandon their plan – they would 
instead proceed with caution.   
 To conclude, we propose that power and politics are not stable social 
entities that lie outside of sensemaking processes. Rather, as our EDA approach 
has shown, they are “made within the process itself”.121 The notion that certain 
actors have more power than others, or have a certain political agenda, is rendered 
a “seemingly objective and concrete phenomena” thanks to the interpretive work of 
members: work that can be illuminated, we propose, by adopting an EDA 
approach.
122
 To adopt an ethnomethodological perspective on power and politics is 
not to recommend that the topic should be removed from the research agenda 
altogether. But it is a plea to change its analytical status – just as 
ethnomethodology has already done for norms, values and rules for instance
123
  - 
from stable social ‘facts’ or ‘forces’ that act as causal agents to an interpretive 
procedure or device that people use to make and display the meaning of (i.e. make 
and give sense to) the behaviour of themselves and others.
124
 As such, we urge 
SAP to follow the ethnomethodological prescription to view strategy – including 
the organizational topography of power and politics – as “ongoing 
accomplishments rather than predetermined social facts”, as members engage in 
the reproductive work of producing an intelligible shared social world.
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Nature of fieldwork Duration 
 
Participant & non-participant observation of 
managers in non-formal settings 
 
 
Continuous over a period of 
 30 months 
 
Combination of participant and non-participant 
observation of the 10 cross-functional Key 
Account “Steering Group” Meetings 
 
 
3-5 hours per meeting, over a 
12 month period 
 
Full & ‘formal’ Work-shadows 
 
5-8 days in length of 2 
marketing managers and 1 
marketing director 
 
 
Participant observation of 17 cross-functional Key 
Account Service/Account Plan implementation 
team meetings 
 
 
1-2 hours per meeting, over a 
12 month period 
 
 
 
Interviews with Board Directors and Managers; 
including regular periodic interviewing of Steering 
Group members during the 12 months of its 
operation. 
 
 
113 of 60-90 minutes each 
 
Document capture: emails, meeting actions-arising 
notes/minutes, flip-chart work from meetings, 
presentations, planning documentation etc. 
 
 
Continuous collection for 
duration of project 
Table 1 Nature and Duration of Fieldwork 
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Barry – Action Researcher 
Sandra – Customer Service Manager 
Sara – Senior Product Manager (Product Segment B) 
Zeb – Consumer Marketing Manager 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Barry: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now often in a business I think the marketing guy or girl 
who’s running marketing has a sort of hidden 
responsibility for hanging it together, this, right. And if 
you have a political situation at Board level where it’s not 
possible to hang it together then it becomes exceptionally 
difficult, right in terms of hanging this whole thing 
together for the customer. And I think Adam [last 
marketing director] was in that position to be honest. 
What is interesting I think is since Adam’s left some 
things seem to be going on that have changed things. I 
think there’s some meetings that are going on. I think, I 
was talking to you Zeb [soon to be marketing director], 
listening to your guys talking and there are some sessions 
going on now that weren’t particularly going on in as 
proactive a way as when Adam was there as they are 
now. Errr [pause] that is also very typical of depar 
[hesitation] of departmentalism that, right, that when you 
shake up the top management you get changes going on 
almost immediately cause what happens at this level, 
where we sit, is all of a sudden  you get on with the job a 
bit easier. In other words, don’t know if you feel that at 
the moment, but that’s the impression I’m getting. And 
it’s no insult to Adam, it’s it’s it’s just the way it is, in 
organisations. It is right [pause] Now I’ve taken off here 
the last two pages which are all about the directors talking 
about themselves right [pause] mmmm. Now because it’s 
so political, a hot potato obviously and I’ll talk a little bit 
about it. As far as the directors are concerned about 
themselves they see that they’re not working as a team, 
they give no integrated viewpoint on the business to the 
rest of the company, they’re intensely self-critical. They 
were devastating about each other and themselves, right 
so I think you can take it quite well actually because they 
were quite critical about themselves, you know. [Head of 
Product Segment B business] right although he was very 
critical of everybody which I think is his, he was 
incredibly critical of himself, you know what I mean he 
called himself a self-opinionated son of a gun you know, 
err [pause] So all of them, so I think actually think quite 
validly that they were being honest because they were 
very you know tough on themselves as well on each other 
but they, they were, they, you could see that they were 
saying to each other “Well we’re just not getting it right 
are we? We are just not hanging together as a team. We 
are not a team as a Board of Directors.” You know we 
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Sandra: 
Barry: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sara: 
Barry: 
Zeb: 
Barry: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sara: 
 
Barry: 
Sara: 
 
 
 
 
 
Barry 
have to keep this round the table, I’m being honest with 
you. But that’s not a signal you want out in the business 
and they don’t think they’re sending it but they’re sending 
it subliminally ’cause you all know it’s the case. And 
everybody I’ve interviewed has said this. 
They get – they’d allow us to say it as well I think. 
Yes. Now we had this discussion about whether or not 
what I should do is have this with this being the directors 
round the table [pause] right [pause] Now I’ve resisted 
that immensely because it’s too difficult, there are too 
many fixed positions, there’s too much history. There’s 
too many people there with too much to lose but not 
enough to gain, right? Everybody round this table has got 
a lot to gain from doing this, right. It’s very low risk 
because if anything goes wrong you can blame me and I 
don’t care about being blamed ‘cause I’m not being paid. 
If it fails it’s just as good as a research opportunity. So 
I’m not here as a consultant right, right. So it’s all up 
really in this sense 
[9 lines omitted for brevity] 
And then what we’ll do is as a group my plan is that 
we’ll, we, that is not individuals, we as a team will have a 
meeting with the directors. When you say “Well this is 
what we reckon we should do on [Key Account 1].” 
Right. Now it won’t be me that’s saying it - before we go 
on, you should understand that it won’t be me it’ll be you 
guys, right, that are saying it, yeah [pause] You 
comfortable with that? 
Yeah definitely. 
Yes. It won’t be me. 
Fine.  
Now, it’s obviously the directors that picked this team so 
the directors have confidence in this group so you 
shouldn’t worry about it in anyway. I think it’s very 
positive, I mean that’s one of the things that’s great about 
Reebok it’s very open, extremely open. I mean it’s great. 
I mean as a research site it’s amazing people just talk to 
you I mean so in in in some ways the micro politics 
doesn’t seem as intense here, I don’t know why. At the 
top level it’s intense. 
In comparison to [Competitor 1] it’s the next [inaudible] a 
whole different page here. 
Is it? 
Yes I think so. Little secret meetings in little cubby holes 
with a few top people, you know it was very very difficult 
in Competitor 1, wasn’t it? [talking to Deputy Sales 
Director Product Segment B - also ex-employee of 
Competitor 1]. A lot of the time you were scared to voice 
an opinion. 
Really? 
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Table 2 Extract from Steering Group Meeting 
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Framing of politics Selected extract (see Table 2) Social action performed by 
framing politics in this way 
Politics is the main source 
of the company’s 
problems  
Barry: “And if you have a political situation at 
Board level where it’s not possible to hang it together then 
it becomes exceptionally difficult, right in terms of hanging 
this whole thing together for the customer.” 
Explaining why the company is 
facing problems. 
 
Politics is ‘natural’ and 
‘normal’ 
 
Barry: “that is also very typical of depar 
[hesitation] of departmentalism that, right, that when you 
shake up the top management you get changes going on 
almost immediately cause what happens at this level, where 
we sit, is all of a sudden  you get on with the job a bit 
easier. In other words, don’t know if you feel that at the 
moment, but that’s the impression I’m getting. And it’s no 
insult to Adam, it’s it’s it’s just the way it is, in 
organisations. It is right.” 
Performing criticism without 
insult. 
This is politically 
sensitive information that 
requires ‘secrecy’ 
Barry: “Now I’ve taken off here the last two pages 
which are all about the directors talking about themselves 
right [pause] mmmm. Now because it’s so political, a hot 
potato obviously and I’ll talk a little bit about it. .... You 
know we have to keep this round the table, I’m being 
honest with you. But that’s not a signal you want out in the 
business” 
Justifying why information is 
not being shared (removing the 
last two pages of the report) and 
why information should not be 
shared (the group should not 
repeat this message elsewhere).  
This information is not 
that politically sensitive. 
Sandra; “... they’d allow us to say it as well I 
think.” 
Suggesting that they could share 
this information more widely 
without causing political upset.  
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Information is true if 
politics is absent: 
criticism of others is 
‘politically motivated’, 
criticism of yourself is not 
Barry: “As far as the directors are concerned about 
themselves they see that they’re not working as a team, they 
give no integrated viewpoint on the business to the rest of 
the company, they’re intensely self-critical. They were 
devastating about each other and themselves, right so I 
think you can take it quite well actually because they were 
quite critical about themselves, you know. [Head of Product 
Segment B business], right, although he was very critical of 
everybody which I think is his, he was incredibly critical of 
himself, you know what I mean he called himself a self-
opinionated son of a gun you know, err [pause] So all of 
them, so I think actually think quite validly that they were 
being honest because they were very you know tough on 
themselves as well on each other but they, they were, they, 
you could see that they were saying to each other “Well 
we’re just not getting it right are we? We are just not 
hanging together as a team. We are not a team as a Board of 
Directors.” 
Rationale for why certain 
opinions should be regarded as 
‘true’ and others ‘false’, and 
therefore who should be 
believed and who should be 
discredited. 
Politics is the cause of 
dysfunctional conflict at 
Board level 
Barry: “Now we had this discussion about whether 
or not what I should do is have this with this being the 
directors round the table [pause] right [pause] Now I’ve 
resisted that immensely because it’s too difficult, there are 
too many fixed positions, there’s too much history. There’s 
too many people there with too much to lose but not enough 
to gain, right?” 
Justifying why the Steering 
Group needs to address the 
‘problem’ themselves, without 
involvement of Board. 
You have something 
politically to gain from 
this. 
Barry: “Everybody round this table has got a lot to 
gain from doing this, right. It’s very low risk because if 
anything goes wrong you can blame me.” 
Persuading the Steering Group 
to invest in the change initiative 
by suggesting they have a vest 
self-interest (‘something to 
gain’) and ‘nothing to lose’ 
 50 
politically, because they already 
have a political scapegoat 
(blaming the action researcher).  
I have no political 
allegiances or self-interest 
(being paid). 
Barry: “I don’t care about being blamed ‘cause I’m 
not being paid. If it fails it’s just as good as a research 
opportunity.” 
Persuading the Steering Group 
to invest in the change initiative 
by suggesting that they can trust 
the action researcher to lead the 
change, because he has no 
ulterior motive (e.g. self-interest 
in earning money, political 
allegiances in the business). 
You have political 
support at the top. 
Barry: “Now, it’s obviously the directors that 
picked this team so the directors have confidence in this 
group so you shouldn’t worry about it in anyway.” 
Encouraging the Steering Group 
to embark upon the change 
initiative by suggesting they 
have political support amongst 
those with power at Board level. 
This company (below 
Director level at least) is 
less political than many 
other companies. 
Barry: “I mean that’s one of the things that’s great 
about Apparat it’s very open, extremely open. I mean it’s 
great. I mean as a research site it’s amazing people just talk 
to you I mean so in in in some ways the micro politics 
doesn’t seem as intense here, I don’t know why. At the top 
level it’s intense.” 
Sara: “In comparison to [Competitor 1] it’s the next 
[inaudible] a whole different page here. ... Little secret 
meetings in little cubby holes with a few top people, ... A 
lot of the time you were scared to voice an opinion.” 
 
Encouraging the Steering Group 
to embark upon the change 
initiative by suggesting they 
should find little political 
resistance to change across the 
company, which is relatively 
apolitical compared to other 
firms in the same industry.  
Table 3 Summary of analysis of extract from Steering Group Meeting 
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Actor Account Analytical stages 
from Woolgar (1998) 
Analytical role: 
“adjudicating 
judgement” 
Managers Clinician’s complaints about the 
new IT system are politically 
motivated ‘resistance’, driven by 
their fear of loss of power and 
control over patients 
Manager’s accounts are 
taken through Stages 
(1) to (5) 
Managers accounts are 
true (neutral and 
disinterested 
assessment of ‘reality’) 
Clinicians Our complaints about the new 
system are motivated by genuine 
concerns over patient wellbeing 
Clinician’s accounts 
are taken to Stage (1) 
only 
Clinician’s accounts 
are false (politically 
motivated distortion of 
‘reality’) 
 
Table 4 Overview of Brown’s (1995) analysis of competing interview accounts in study of IT implementation in a hospital 
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Actor Account EDA analysis Analytical role: study 
member’s accounts 
Managers Clinician’s 
complaints about the 
new IT system are 
politically motivated 
‘resistance’, 
motivated by their 
fear of loss of power 
and control over 
patients 
Managers use ‘power and 
politics’ as a member’s 
method for making sense 
of the reactions of 
clinicians to the new IT 
system 
Analyst should study (but 
not ‘adjudicate’ on) three 
things:  
(a) when, how, and where 
such accounts are made; 
(b) what the accounts do 
for members in the contexts 
of their use (e.g. what 
decisions or other practical 
consequences flow from 
accepting certain accounts);  
(c) how rival accounts are 
sorted, sifted and settled by 
members, with what 
consequences for those 
involved.
1
  
Clinicians Our complaints about 
the new system are 
motivated by genuine 
concerns over patient 
wellbeing 
Clinicians use ‘patient 
wellbeing’ as a members 
method for making sense 
of what it ‘means’ (i.e. 
‘bad news for patients’) 
and how they should 
respond to it (i.e. ‘block 
it’)  
 
Table 5 EDA analysis of Brown’s (1995) study of IT implementation in a hospital 
                                                 
1
 For example, accepting managers accounts as ‘true’ would mean the hospital would implement the IT system and discount the clinician’s concerns. 
Accepting clinicians accounts as ‘true’, on the other hand, would mean the IT system should be abandoned or significantly changed. 
